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Few tropes in American legal teaching are more firmly entrenched than the criminal law
division between Model Penal Code and common law states. Yet even a cursory look at
current state codes indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded. No state continues to cling
to ancient English common law, nor does any state adhere fully to the Model Penal Code.
In fact, those states that adopted portions of the Code have since produced a substantial
body of case law-what this Article terms "new common law"-transforming it. Taking
the controversial position that criminal law pedagogy is antiquated, this Article proposes
a radical update, emphasizing two objectives: (i) the need to stress the interplay between
individual state cases and codes, and (2) the need to abandon the position that the Model
Penal Code represents a bold new vision of criminal law reform, particularly since that
vision is itself almost half a century old.
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INTRODUCTION
Few tropes in American legal teaching are more firmly entrenched
than the criminal law division between Model Penal Code ("MPC") and
common law states. Yet even a cursory look at current state codes
indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded. No state continues to cling to
ancient English common law, nor does any state fully adhere to the
MPC. In fact, those states that adopted portions of the MPC have since
produced a substantial body of case law-what this Article terms "new
common law" -transforming it. Taking the controversial position that
criminal law pedagogy is antiquated, this Article proposes a radical
update, emphasizing two objectives: (i) the need to stress the interplay
between individual state codes and cases, and (2) the need to abandon
the position that the MPC represents a bold new vision of criminal law
reform, particularly since that vision is itself almost half a century old.
To illustrate, this Article will proceed in four parts. Part I
interrogates the myth of the "common law" state, showing that few, if
any, states continue to abide by judicially created law heralding from
Elizabethan England. Part II interrogates the myth of the MPC state,
showing that no state adopted the MPC in its entirety, nor did any state
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adopt its most ambitious reforms, making the study of the MPC as a free-
standing code misleading. Part III looks even more closely at so-called
MPC states, showing how every state that did adopt portions of the MPC
has since developed its own new common law interpreting it. Part IV
examines the theoretical implications of looking more closely at the new
common law, arguing that it leads to a more precise pedagogy, as well as
a more empirically minded, culturally rooted understanding of how the
criminal law actually works.
At its core, American criminal law reflects a sedimentary deposit of
localized, state-level, majoritarian politics. While scholars such as
William Stuntz have derided such politics, even criticizing them as
"pathological,"' this Article argues that they are, in fact, an inevitable
symptom of democratic rule. To rail against them, this piece maintains, is
at once antidemocratic and futile. Even if the drafting of criminal
legislation were handed over to politically insulated experts, as scholars
such as Stuntz and Paul Robinson argue it should be,' judges would still
bend that law to conform to majority will, imposing a new common law
onto even the most politically insulated, utilitarian codes.
Beneath this Article's endorsement of a new common law approach
to criminal law lies a larger challenge to the political and pedagogical
assumptions underlying legal education generally in the United States.
Perhaps foremost among these assumptions is the notion that state and
local law is somehow less significant, less interesting, and ultimately less
worthy of attention than national law. Put simply, whenever national law
can be taught, it is; and whenever national law cannot be taught because
it does not exist, then fictional models are used.' Though convenient for
scholars who look down on state law as inferior, such an approach leads
to imprecision and, this Article maintains, a false sense of law's very
nature.
For example, most casebook authors presume that the fields of
psychology and utilitarian philosophy are best suited for explaining
criminal law and guiding criminal law reform.' Implicit in such an
I. william J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 1oo MICH. L. REv. 505, 509-12
(2ool).
2. See id. at 582-83; Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633,652-53 (2oo5).
3. See Douglas A. Berman, The Model Penal Code Second: Might "Film Schools" Be in Need of
a Remake?, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 165 (2003); Russell Covey, Should We Stop Teaching the Model
Penal Code?, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 25, 2006), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2oo6/o7/should-
westop_.html.
4. See generally RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); GEORGE E. Dix & M.
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CASES]; MARKUS D. DUBBER &
MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2oo5); JOHN KAPLAN ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CASES]; CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA
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approach, however, is the view that democratic majorities do not, in fact,
know what is best for them. Indeed, some criminal law scholars have
made this point explicit, arguing for the de-politicization of the criminal
law-making process.'
While criminal law casebooks reinforce the notion that electoral
majorities are inept, few fields of legal practice rely more heavily on a
lawyer's ability to understand local majority sentiment than does
criminal law.6 Whether experts disprove of average people or not, it is
average people who decide the outcome of criminal cases, and
consequently it is average people who inform an attorney's decision to
proceed to trial or accept a plea bargain.' Further, until the moment that
criminal law scholars succeed in overturning democratic government,
average people retain the power to change the law through the electoral
process.' Law students should be exposed to the methodologies of legal
history and legal anthropology, both of which focus on the ascertainment
and analysis of local practice, local knowledge, and local community
norms, rather than abstract theory.' Unless criminal law scholars accept
the relevance of such methodologies to the explication of their field, law
students will find themselves increasingly deprived of even a basic
understanding of how judicial opinions and legislative actions operate
together to construct and reconstruct criminal offenses.
I. THE MYTH OF THE COMMON LAW STATE
One of the most presumptive pillars of American criminal law
courses is the common law state.o Criminal law casebooks, hornbooks,
and even commercial outlines all agree that while some states can best be
characterized as MPC states, others are best designated as common law."
HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE
STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2oo5); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS
(7th ed. 2003).
5. See generally Stuntz, supra note i; Robinson & Cahill, supra note 2.
6. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just?
Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1839-40 (2ooo).
7. See id. at 1852, 1857.
8. See id. at 1868.
9. See generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 4; RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS & ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2004); Dix & SHARLOT, supra note 4; DUBBER &
KELMAN, supra note 4; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 4; LAFAVE, CASES, supra note 4; LEE & HARRIS, supra
note 4; ROBINSON, supra note 4; WEINREB, supra note 4; Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal
Law, in DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at 1-2.
10. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 27-31 (3d ed. 2oo) [hereinafter DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING] (considering in detail both the common law and the MPC); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66-67 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES]. See generally
STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (noting distinctions between common law and MPC
states on the topics of mistake, proximate cause, duress, necessity, attempt, conspiracy, and accomplice
liability).
II. See sources cited supra note lo.
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Yet few agree on what precisely this means. According to criminal law
scholar Joshua Dressler, for example, common law states originally
enforced judge-made crimes derived from England." Yet, Dressler
argues, "[m]ost states, often by statute, have abolished common law
crimes," meaning that even in so-called common law states, "[t]he
legislature is the pre-eminent lawmaking body in the realm of criminal
law," and courts do not originate law so much as interpret it.'
If legislatures are the "pre-eminent" lawmaking bodies in America,
why bother with the fiction of the common law state? According to
some, even though all states boast a criminal code, some have
nevertheless "retained" respect for the ancient common law, particularly
in cases where common law crimes are not mentioned in state codes. 4 If
a state has a "reception" statute, in other words, then prosecutors can
successfully charge defendants with crimes that are not enumerated in
their state's criminal statutes so long as those crimes are mentioned in
Blackstone's Commentaries or relate to an English case directly on point
decided before 1607.
How often does this happen? According to Joshua Dressler, such
prosecutions are "rare." 6 Criminal law scholar Wayne LaFave agrees,
noting that prosecutions for common law crimes are not only few and far
between, but have tended to involve idiosyncratic, nineteenth century-
style offenses, including for example "being a common scold,"
"maliciously killing a horse," and "burning a body in [a] cellar furnace.""
Given their rarity, do reception statutes warrant the attention of
first-year criminal law students, whose task it is to gain an introduction to
the most important aspects of the criminal law? Probably not,
particularly because the vast majority of states reject them.'8 However,
there remains one more reason why the pedagogical trope of the
common law state may exist. According to Dressler, some states have
rejected reception statutes but still "codified the common law felonies,"
meaning that they employ common law terms to explicate their criminal
12. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note lo, at 27 (noting that in English common law "the
definitions of crimes and the rules of criminal responsibility were promulgated by courts rather than
by the Parliament").
13. Id. at 28.
14. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES, supra note lo, at 66 (noting that some states continue to accept the
ancient common law of England "either by an express 'reception statute' or without the aid of any
statute").
15. See Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff The
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAI L. REv. 351, 363 (1983); David J. Bederman,
The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1382
(1996).
16. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note io, at 28.
17. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 1o, at 67.
18. Id. at 67.
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statutes." Hence, it is important to retain some memory of the common
law, presumably so that students can understand the law in those states
that codified the common law.
Is this really true? As this Part will demonstrate, most crimes
enumerated in American state codes-including classic common law
crimes like murder-possess just as many distinguishing American
characteristics as English ones, rendering arguments that American
students need to understand ancient English common law nonsensical.
Indeed, this Part posits that the only unifying factor shared by so-called
common law states is not whether they preserved retention statutes or
codified the common law, but that they rejected the MPC. Currently,
only fourteen states in the union refuse to incorporate any portion of the
MPC into their statutory criminal law, making all but one of them
(Louisiana), by default, "common law states."2 o Included are California,
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Louisiana." The last state, Louisiana, derives its code
directly from French civil law, meaning that it is perhaps best described
as an indigenous, non-MPC code state rather than a common law state.
Perhaps ironically, the same could be said for the remaining
fourteen states that rejected the MPC. All are arguably better described
as indigenous code states than common law states. To illustrate, it is
helpful to look at how those fourteen states that did not adopt the MPC
treat homicide."
59. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note to, at 29.
20. For a compilation of states that adopted the MPC, see Dannye Holley, The Influence of the
Model Penal Code's Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities,
Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 229, 229-30 & n.2 (1997).
2 1. Id.
22. Under English common law, murder originally applied to both intentional and unintentional
killings. Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective By Which to Understand Today's
Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. I, 4 (2006). In the 1820s, however,
Parliament enacted a statute carving out an exception to murder for cases where defendants claimed
benefit of clergy, creating the statutory lesser-included offense of manslaughter. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS 215-16 (Robert Malcom Kerr ed., 1962)
(1765-69) (describing 9 GEO. 4, c. 31, § 9); JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 62o (2oo9). While law professors may say
that English statutes should be considered part of the English common law because they come from
England, this confuses the notion of what, precisely, the common law is. Is it judge-made or is it
English? Casebook authors maintain that it was judge-made, but in many cases it was not. This means
that it is probably better to think of it simply as English law. Yet, if it is simply English law, then why
not distinguish between English law-statutory and judge-made-and American law? Of course, to
concede that there may have been an American criminal law that preceded the MPC would
undermine the assumption, implicit in American casebooks, that pre-MPC law was an archaic remnant
of the eighteenth century, much in need of an overhaul. However, core aspects of American "common
law" regimes are decidedly American innovations, with little antecedent in either English law or
judge-made law.
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A. MURDER
Under English common law, murder was not divided into degrees,
but rather included simple distinctions between intentional killings done
with "malice aforethought,"" and unintentional killings, known as
manslaughter.2 4 Yet, out of the fourteen states that rejected the MPC,
only six employ the English common law term "malice aforethought.""
Of those states that continue to employ malice aforethought, all but
one (South Carolina) divide the offense into first and second degrees"-
something the English common law did not do-and subsequently rely
on uniquely American language to ascertain what, precisely, constitutes
murder. The most commonly cited language comes from Pennsylvania,
which divided murder and manslaughter into degrees in 1794, declaring
that any killing done in a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" manner
warranted classification as murder in the first degree."
While criminal law casebooks and hornbooks concede that
Pennsylvania has influenced many American states, they continue to
cling to the common law divide, omitting any discussion of additional
non-judge-made criteria that so-called common law states use to
determine what precisely constitutes first degree murder." For example,
Rhode Island declares that "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought is murder," a nod to English common law, but then
goes on to distinguish first degree murder by including instances where a
killing is committed "against any law enforcement officer in the
performance of his or her duty or committed against an assistant
attorney general or special assistant attorney general in the performance
23. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 217-18. Incidentally, the history of the crime of murder in
England raises questions about the extent to which even English "common law" was court generated.
Prior to the reign of Edward III, for example, murder in England focused primarily on the killing of
Danes by English natives, a crime for which entire communities could be punished. Id. at 217. Edward
changed this policy by statute, introducing the current definition of killing by "malice aforethought."
Id.
24. Id. at 216.
25. The six states are California, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §I(west 2008); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2oo.oo (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West
Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-23-I (Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1o (1985). California
actually incorporated malice aforethought after it adopted New York's Penal Code in 1872. See
Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's Historical Antecedents, 59 RUTGERSs L.J 521, 537 (1988).
26. The only state that does not divide murder into first and second degrees is South Carolina.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-to (1985).
27. Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L.
REV. 759,771-72 (1949)-
28. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note lo, at 508-11; DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at
I-2. See generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 4; Dix & SHARLOT, supra note 4; DUBBER & KELMAN, supra
note 4; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 4; LAFAVE, CASES, supra note 4; LEE & HARRIS, supra note 4;
ROBINSON, supra note 4; WEINREB, supra note 4.
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of his or her duty."29 This last provision, protecting prosecutors and
police, is neither a product of the Pennsylvania model nor the English
common law, but rather of the legislative and political history of Rhode
Island.
Nevada is similar. Even while clinging to malice aforethought for
murder generally, Nevada distinguishes first degree murder by limiting it
to cases where the killing is "[c]ommitted in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery,
burglary, invasion of the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual
molestation of a child under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of
an older person or vulnerable person."o3 While many of the above fall
under the doctrine of felony murder, this does not necessarily mean that
they therefore derive from the common law of England. Indeed, criminal
law scholar Guyora Binder has shown that felony murder does not in fact
derive from England at all, meaning that it is just as much an American
doctrine as a British one.
Further, Nevada's additional provisions for first degree murder are
also American. In Nevada, first degree murder includes killings that take
place "on the property of a public or private school, at an activity
sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while the bus
was engaged in its official duties."" Such attendant circumstances are
unique to Nevada and are not products of English common law, forged
in an era long before children rode buses to school.
Similarly unique circumstances rear their heads in other states as
well. In Massachusetts, for example, any killing done with "deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought" -an odd combination of the
Pennsylvania and common law definitions-is first degree murder, as
well as any killing committed "with extreme atrocity or cruelty." 3  In
Oklahoma, first degree murder includes any killing done with malice
aforethought as well as any killing done in conjunction with child abuse,
a particularly despicable crime for which a different mens rea term is
used: "the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of
unreasonable force" on a child.34
California also distinguishes between first and second degree
murder by attendant circumstances, including whether the killing was
done "by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § II-23-1 (Supp. 2010).
30. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (2oo9).
31. Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 63 (2oo4)
(covering the American origins of the felony murder rule).
32. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (2oo9).
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § i (West 2oo8).
34. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 70.7 (West Supp. 2011).
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inflict death."" This statute was enacted in 199336 after a string of drive-
by shootings in Los Angeles during the late 1980s and early 1990S.31
Republican Governor Pete Wilson supported the law,'8 and even gang-
members themselves attempted to stop the practice." For example, only
a few months after the statute's enactment, two hundred members of Los
Angeles area "warring gangs" called for a stop to drive-by shootings,
some threatening shooters with retribution in prison.4o The Mexican
Mafia, known simply as "La EME" or "the letter M," "ordered
thousands of Latino gang members to halt drive-by shootings" in the Los
Angeles area.4
Though California's drive-by statute reflects a particular aspect of
local culture in Los Angeles, criminal law casebooks continue to portray
California as a common law state, implying that it somehow continues to
adhere to English common law. On the contrary, however, California's
clear allusion to gang-related violence represents the kind of unique
circumstance that distinguishes American from English law. To tell
students that murder in each of these states is based simply on ancient
English notions of malice aforethought is wrong.
Despite malice aforethought's continued presence in American
casebooks, most so-called common law states do not employ the term at
all, making its pedagogical relevance even more questionable. To take
just a few examples, Idaho-also presumably a common law state-
incorporated the Pennsylvania model but, unlike California, rejected the
term malice aforethought, adding instead a series of its own mens rea
components. These include murder done with the "intent" to "execute
vengeance," "extort something from the victim," or "satisfy some sadistic
inclination," none of which appeared in the English common law.42
Vermont, another common law state, also rejected malice aforethought,
but included none of the additional mens rea requirements that emerged
in California or Idaho, simply relying on "willful, deliberate, and
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2oo8).
36. Id.
37. 3 Killed, 6 Injured in 2 Drive-By Shootings, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at 4; Gregory Crouch,
Drive-By Shootings in 2 Cities Leave 3 Men Wounded, L.A. TIMES, June iI, 1989, at I2; Wendy
Paulson, Drive-By Shootings Raise Police Alarm, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at 2; Drive-by Shootings
Wound 4, Including 2 Young Children, L.A. TIMEs, May 26, 1988, at 4; Woman Killed and 6 Injured in
Drive-By Shootings, L.A. TIMES, July II, 1988, at 2.
38. Richard Howland, Gangs Face Tougher Punishment: New Law Will Hike Drive-By Penalties
to 20 Years to Life, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Sept. 30, 1993, at AT.
39. David A. Avila & Davan Maharaj, Santa Ana Gang Members Step Outside Turf Call for
Peace, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at I; Mary Anne Perez, Issue: Drive-By Shootings, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
22, 1993, at 23.
40. Avila & Davan, supra note 37.
41. Id.
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (2004).
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premeditated killing."43 Mississippi drafted first degree murder to include
killing "done with deliberate design," a unique rendition of the
Pennsylvania model." In Vermont and Michigan, murder must be
committed by "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," again direct
takes on the Pennsylvania model.45
The tired pedagogical technique of using malice aforethought as a
foil for the MPC should be brought to an end as it applies only to six
states and is therefore grossly unrepresentative. However, defenders of
the common law fiction will invariably mention South Carolina-the
only state that does not divide murder into degrees-as a living, if lonely,
embodiment of England's legacy. Yet even South Carolina includes
uniquely American language within its definition of murder, including
"[k]illing by stabbing or thrusting," a capital crime applicable to
instances where the victim "has not then any weapon drawn" or "has not
then first stricken" the defendant.#" Of course, there is a statutory
exception for anyone who happens to cause death while "chastising or
correcting his child," rendering the stabbing manslaughter."
B. GRADING SCHEMES FOR OTHER FELONIES
Is murder the only area where so-called "common law states"
depart significantly from the ancient English common law? No. While
most criminal law casebooks recognize the Pennsylvania innovation
when it comes to murder, they fail to discuss similar irading schemes, all
uniquely American, which apply to other offenses.4 In the nineteenth
century, American states developed grading schemes for the most violent
felonies, not just murder. By 1857, for example, the New York legislature
had graded the offenses of burglary, arson, and robbery, substantially
transforming the common law definitions of each.49
Interestingly, Pennsylvania did not grade its violent nonhomicide
felonies until after New York, while New York did not grade murder
43. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2o09).
44. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(I)(a) (2oo6).
45. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2009).
46. Indeed, only one state-South Carolina-continues to define murder in the old common law
fashion, refusing to divide it into first or second degrees. Yet, even there legislators have carefully
introduced uniquely American qualifiers, adding for example an extra penalty if the murder was
committed "within a radius of one hundred yards of the grounds of a public or private childcare
facility." S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-13-200 (2010).
47. Id.
48. DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at 236-37.
49. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES COMPRISING A
GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COMMON AND CIVIL LAW AND A DIGEST OF THE
PENAL STATUTES OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT, AND OF MASSACHUSETTS, NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA,
VIRGINIA, AND OHIO WITH THE DECISIONS ON CASES ARISING UPON THOSE STATUTES, 682-S3, 706-07,
716-17 (4th ed. 1857).
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until 186o, over half a century after Pennsylvania."o Therefore, to say that
New York followed the Pennsylvania model would not be entirely
correct, as it graded its violent felonies prior to the Quaker State. In fact,
in regards to felonies other than murder, it would probably be more
correct to say that Pennsylvania followed New York, for by the time New
York graded its felonies, Pennsylvania still graded only murder." Just as
there was a Pennsylvania model for murder, in other words, so too was
there arguably a separate New York model for burglary, arson, and
robbery, one that so-called common law states have all tended to follow.
Other criminal statutes similarly reflect the failure of so-called
common law states to follow English common law, with statutory rape
perhaps foremost among them." Inspired by a 1576 statute enacted in
Elizabethan England, for example, in 1869 North Carolina established
the age of consent for statutory rape at ten." By 1917, however, North
Carolina raised this age to twelve, increasing it again to sixteen in 1923"5
Rather than a faithful representation of ancient English common law, in
other words, the Tarheel State's age of consent reflected insecurities
about teenage behavior immediately after World War I, the height of the
jazz age.
Even states that did not adopt the MPC participated in the process
of codification and transformation.5 Massachusetts provides an example.
By 1857, Massachusetts had codified the crime of kidnapping to include
"forcibly carrying" persons against their will "out of [the] state" and,
also, "secretly confining or imprisoning" any person "against [his] will."' 6
The English common law considered the act of confining to constitute
false imprisonment instead of kidnapping. 7 Why Massachusetts decided
to incorporate false imprisonment into its statute on kidnapping is not
clear, though the innovation caught on in other common law states like
Idaho, which includes in its statute anyone who "confines" a victim
"secretly," even as it follows the non-common law practice of grading."'
Perhaps because American kidnapping confuses the English
common law concept of false imprisonment, it is not discussed at length
in criminal law casebooks. Yet even crimes that are mentioned in
criminal law casebooks have been altered in common law states, as we
50. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Codification of the Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
51. See WHARTON, supra note 49, at 682-83, 76-07, 716-17.
52. Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1501, 1547, n.155 (1998).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
56. WHARTON, supra note 49, at 596.
57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 218.
58. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4501 (2o04).
July 2ol1] 1643
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have seen with murder." Further, such alterations extend to almost all
specific common law offenses through the American statutory process of
grading. Put simply, few if any common law crimes exist in their original
common law form, confounding the analytic category of the common law
state. In the next Section, an explanation for why law teachers persist in
the fiction of the common law state will be advanced, one rooted less in
pedagogy than politics.
C. POLITICS OF LEGAL PEDAGOGY
Keeping the above examples in mind, why do criminal law
professors and criminal law casebooks persist in the fiction of the
common law state?6 Part of the story lies in the politics of legal
pedagogy. Prior to 1940, criminal law casebooks consisted-as their
names suggest-almost entirely of cases." Renowned criminal law
professors such as the University of Chicago's Joseph Henry Beale
included anywhere from six to nine cases per topic in their casebooks,
omitting any mention of law review articles, philosophical treatises, or
sociological studies.6 ' This meant that before a student covered a subject,
say provocation or self-defense, he walked through at least six factual
scenarios and six legal conclusions, from which he could then synthesize
a formal legal rule.
Beginning in the 193os, a young Columbia law professor named
Herbert Wechsler began to change this.64 Convinced that Beale's case
method tended to produce overly conservative, narrow-minded attorneys,
Wechsler worked with a colleague, Jerome Michael, to produce a new
kind of criminal law casebook, one that dramatically reduced the number
of cases students had to read, substituting in their place bits of law review
articles, paragraphs from major philosophical treatises, and statistical
studies.
59. For example, North Carolina, one of the states commonly cited as a common law state,
significantly altered the English common law definition of rape by refusing to require that victims
forcibly resist their attackers. In 1946, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that in cases where
victims suffered from "fear, fright, or coercion," a showing of actual force by the defendant was not
necessary. State v. Thompson, 40 S.E.2d 620, 623 (N.C. 1946). Despite the divergence between so-
called common law states and the ancient common law of England, scholars may still argue that
certain American states still recognize the common law of England as a formal matter, and even allow
for punishment of noncodified, common law crimes. See LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES, supra note lo, at 66.
Rhode Island is an example. R.I. GEN. LAWS § II-I-I (2oo2) (adopting common law crimes).
6o. See, e.g., DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at 4; LAFAVE, CASES, supra note 4.
61. See generally, e.g., JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
UPON CRIMINAL LAW (1894); see also Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the
Political History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 Omo ST. J. CRim. L. 217, 221 (2oo9) [hereinafter
Walker, Anti-Case Method].
62. See Walker, Anti-Case Method, supra note 61, at 221.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 218.
65. Id. at 225-29.
[Vol. 62:I1633
THE NEW COMMON LAW
To Wechsler's mind, substituting outside materials for cases
promised to change the way that students thought about law. Rather
than learning to revere legal opinions, Wechsler hoped students would
come to criticize them. Regularly, Wechsler included notes that
prompted students to question the normative basis of judicial opinions,
at times even mocking judicial deference to precedent and English
common law.6 Though such an iconoclastic approach risked leaving
students confused and arguably even unprepared for the criminal bar,
Wechsler did not particularly care whether his students entered criminal
practice." In fact, the administration at Columbia joined him in
discouraging students from becoming criminal lawyers, partly because
the field tended to be low paying, but also because defense attorneys
tended to be associated with the criminal element and prosecutors
tended to become politically compromised.6
Enter the modern criminal law casebook. Seizing an opportunity to
nudge criminal law away from practitioners and towards future
"legislators," Wechsler published his book in 1940 to widespread
acclaim, dramatically- perhaps even tragically -influencing an entire
generation of law students."o Foremost among such students was a young
Navy veteran named Sanford Kadish, who took Wechsler's criminal law
course in 1946 and, inspired by Wechsler's law and society approach,
then went on to produce his own iconic, Wechsler-inspired text in 1962."
Why are Kadish and Wechsler relevant to understanding the
division between common law and MPC states? From 1952 to 1962
Wechsler served as the Reporter for the American Law Institute's
("ALI") Model Penal Code project, overseeing the creation of the code,
a production that younger scholars like Kadish reverently emphasized in
their casebooks." Completed in 1962, the MPC introduced a series of
revisions to criminal law definitions that, presumably, had themselves
come directly from the ancient common law of England. In fact, the
MPC Commentaries repeatedly referenced the "Common-Law
Background" of American criminal law, using it as a foil for the
innovations introduced by the MPC." To anyone unfamiliar with the
statutory nuance of American criminal codes, the MPC Commentaries
themselves made it logical to distinguish between MPC states and
common law states, a divide that scholars like Kadish imported into their
66. Id.
67. Id. at 230.
68. Id. at 230-31-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 245.
71. Id. at 238-44.
72. Id. at 237, 241-42.
73. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3 cmt. I (1980).
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casebooks.74 Though much of that law was itself codified, Kadish chose to
refer to states that either did not adopt the MPC or had yet to adopt it as
"common law," not code, states."
II. THE MYTH OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE STATE
While thirty-four states adopted portions of the MPC, no state
adopted all of it.76 Even states that adopted much of it-New York,
Illinois, and Missouri are examples-tended to amend MPC definitions
with new legislation. Why? A brief look at the archaeology of state
codes indicates that those portions of the MPC that challenged local,
cultural values tended to fail, while those sections that simply reiterated
what many people already felt tended to succeed. This rendered so-
called "MPC" states hybrid regimes that enjoyed some of the modern
innovations provided by the MPC, yet retained distinctive aspects of
older, more local law."
A. INCHOATE OFFENSES
To illustrate, one of the MPC's most heralded reforms was a
recommendation that inchoate offenses -conspiracy, attempt, and so
on-be punished just as harshly as completed offenses, a rule that
coincided nicely with the instrumentalist view that individuals who
attempted to commit crimes were just as dangerous as individuals who
completed crimes.7 9 Yet no state adopted the rule, indicating that voters
were simply not willing to jettison traditional notions that individuals
who completed crimes were guiltier than those who did not." Similarly,
no state adopted the MPC's elimination of the overt act requirement in
conspiracies chargeable as first or second degree offenses. 8' Traditionally,
74. Walker, supra note 61, at 241-42.
75. Kadish, supra note 25, at 537.
76. For a compilation of states that adopted the MPC, see Holley, supra note 20, at 229 & 0.2.
77. See, e.g., ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 2, at 64o (describing legislative amendments to
Illinois's criminal code that undermined MPC definitions).
78. Of course, that MPC states actually possess a mlange of old statutory language raises
questions about the legitimacy of designating certain states "MPC states" to begin with, particularly
because those portions of the MPC that were rejected tended to leave significant areas of law up to
prior definition, making the states hybrid regimes at best.
79. See generally MARKUS D. DUBBER, THE MODEL PENAL CODE (2004).
So. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview,
io NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319,340-41 (2oo7).
81. Examples of state statutes requiring overt acts include: ALA. CODE § I3A-4 -3 (LexisNexis
2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.120 (20io); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003 (20o0); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
3-401 (2oo6); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-201 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 952-53A-48 (2ol1); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. II, § 513 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 777.04 (20o0); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-8 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 705-520 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-2 (West Supp. 2011); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-2 (2011);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 7o6.s (West 2oo3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-33o2 (2oul); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 506.040 (West 2oo6); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17-A, § 151 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.175 (West
2009); Mo. REv. STAT. § 564.016 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (2010).
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conspiracy required an agreement to commit a crime and an overt act in
furtherance of that crime.8' However, in an attempt to ramp up controls
for future dangerousness, the MPC eliminated the overt act requirement
for serious crimes,' transforming the offense into an Orwellian exercise
in thought control. While some scholars praised this ultra-aggressive
approach, all thirty-four states that adopted portions of the MPC
balked." Even New York and Illinois, both of which suffered longstanding
problems with organized crime, rejected the MPC approach and held
that an overt act must be proven for every grade of conspiracy, even the
most serious.
How can such digressions be rationalized? One likely explanation is
that state legislators felt the MPC's innovations outstripped popular
notions of how certain crimes should be punished. In the case of inchoate
crimes like conspiracy and attempt, for example, the MPC may simply
have appeared too harsh. Though the MPC's position was logically
consistent with an emphasis on controlling dangerousness, its elevation
of mental state above conduct appeared too much for legislators to
accept, even for conspiracies that involved organized crime.
B. CRIMES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Conversely, when crimes involved children, the public seemed more
eager for punishment than the MPC. In a remarkable continuation of its
emphasis on mental state, for example, the MPC allowed adults guilty of
sleeping with minors to escape strict liability unless the child was ten
years old or younger.8 Unwilling to provide sex offenders such relief, a
majority of states rejected the Code's statutory rape provision.7 As we
have seen, this very age had been contemplated by English law during
the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and rejected by American common law
states like North Carolina.8 Instead, states set the age of victims at
thirteen in some jurisdictions, and as high as seventeen in others." For
example, Missouri declared statutory rape chargeable to individuals who
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (1985).
84. See sources cited supra note 81.
8s. N.Y. PENAL LAW §105.20 (20II); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-2 (West Supp. 2011).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985).
87. See Ross E. Cheit & Laura Braslow, Statutory Rape: An Empirical Examination of Claims of
"Overreaction," in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 85, 87-88 (Nancy E. Dowd et al.
eds., 2oo6); 6 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts § 4 (Supp. 2005). While the MPC's statutory rape provision
represented an extremely low age, the MPC did not completely absolve defendants who had
intercourse with females between the ages of ten and sixteen. So long as they were four years older,
those individuals could be found guilty of a new crime: "Corruption of Minors," which constituted a
third-degree felony, two grades lower than statutory rape, a felony of the first degree. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.3 (1985).
88. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 237-38 (citing I Hal. P.C. 631).
89. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.032 (2olo).
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had intercourse with minors under fourteen years of age.' Yet, a
fourteen-year-old could, with the permission of a judge, enter into
marriage and obviate the rule." This "marital rape exemption"
represented a direct reflection not of the MPC's emphasis on treatment,
but of "a relic of the past," a type of shotgun wedding provision that
presumed "girls are sure to be better off with a husband to look after
them rather than be subjected to a life on welfare."" In fact, Missouri's
treatment of sexual offenses like statutory rape reflects precisely the kind
of local, cultural specificity that students miss when assigned either the
MPC or English common law.
What larger lessons can be learned from looking at state rejections
of MPC provisions on statutory rape, attempt, and conspiracy? Simply
because states adopted portions of the MPC did not mean that they
adopted all of the Code, or even its most distinctive sections. Further,
denoting certain states as MPC states only obfuscates the fact that even
those states most open to the MPC remained, in the final analysis,
hybrids. Either they blended the MPC with older state codes, conflated
state statutes with ancient English common law rules, or carved out their
own, culturally distinct paths.
C. LOCAL POLITICS AND NEW YORK'S TREATMENT OF MURDER
Another area where the MPC failed to convince state legislatures
was murder. Frustrated at state tendencies to reduce premeditation to an
instant, the MPC's drafters collapsed first and second degree murder into
a single offense, triggered whenever a defendant "causes the death of
another human being" purposely, knowingly, or "recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."" While the drafters retained some exceptions for the death penalty,
all thirty-four states that adopted portions of the MPC rejected the
Code's recommendations, choosing instead to preserve the distinction
between first and second degree.
Often, the decision to preserve or expand first degree murder
reflected local politics. New York provides an example. Out of all the
states in the union that adopted portions of the MPC, New York should
arguably have been the most pro-MPC, if for no other reason than that
New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller assigned Wechsler to serve on
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kelly C. Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The
Victimization of Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 255, 258 (1997); see also
BIENEN, supra note 52.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1-210.2 (1985).
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its Temporary Commission to Revise New York's Penal Law.94 Though a
supporter of the MPC, particularly the reduction of murder to one
degree, Wechsler remained acutely aware of the political pressures that
voters exerted in New York and subsequently tailored the code to local
conditions.' To illustrate:
In 1961, New York was the last state in the Union to impose a
mandatory death penalty for all cases of first degree murder. To
Weschler, any move to alter that law required holding "public
hearings" in order to build popular support for legal change.
Wechsler's interest in holding hearings reflected a democratic strain
that ran through much of [New York's adoption of the MPC]. For
example, at a Commission meeting on December 8, 1961, Wechsler
warned that the "controversial" issue of the death penalty presented
the Commission with a unique "problem" in that public attention to it
far outweighed public interest in other aspects of the criminal law, for
example notions of culpability, justification, and excuse. To avoid
jeopardizing important reforms of the entire code, in other words,
Wechsler advocated catering to popular opinion on the question of the
death penalty "so as not to impede the progress of a lot of other work
that will not be controversial." "My own view," continued Wechsler,
"is that a careful effort should be made to separate these issues to
which the public and the legislature are to be really divided."g6
One issue that Wechsler feared might divide the public was the
death penalty. To avoid a political backlash on the penalty, he
recommended that the Commission "educate the legislature and the
public," particularly on issues of sentencing." He also lobbied in favor of
retaining the death penalty, but only in two limited circumstances:
(i) where a defendant killed a police officer "acting in the line of duty,"
and (2) where the defendant murdered a prison guard.8
For the most part, such attention to moderate reform and popular
reception worked, engendering little political resistance. "From both
sides of the aisle today," reported the New York Times on June 4, 1965,
''were applause and lavish praise for the commission chairman,
Republican Assemblyman Richard J. Bartlett."" Precisely because the
Committee had been careful not to offend the public, even granting
concessions to avoid backlash, it had been able to achieve substantive
reform."
Yet, the vagaries of popular opinion remained. Despite Wechsler's
careful attention to popular caprice, the Commission's attempt to restrict
94. Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal Code, and the Uses of
Revenge, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 1017, 1037 [hereinafter Walker, American Oresteial
95. Id. at 1020.
96. Id. at 1042.
97. Id.
98. Rockefeller Gets Bill on Abolition of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1965, at i.
99. John Sibley, Assembly Passes a Total Revision of the Penal Law, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 1965, at i.
Too. Id.
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the death penalty failed to withstand popular anger at criminals,
particularly as crime rates began rising in the late 1960s."'' In October
1968, for example, a legislative committee met in New York to decide
whether to expand the scope of capital punishment.'o2 Senator Edward
Speno, the committee chair, announced that "many legislators" in New
York had received "heavy mail" urging an expansion of cases where the
penalty applied." Much of this mail had been triggered by rising crime."4
When New York City Controller Mario Procaccino called for a "get
tough" policy on crime during a public hearing in Manhattan, including
reinstatement of the electric chair for murderers, audience members
cheered.' Conversely, "groans and cat-calls" inundated psychiatrist
Henry Peckstein when he warned that "too much repressive legislation"
could lead to a "fascist state."' 6
In 1971, New York state legislators extended capital punishment to
anyone who killed a corrections officer "while he is performing his
official duties."" In 1973, New York City mayoral candidate Mario
Biaggi called for the execution of "hired assassins," "those responsible
for the killing of a witness to a serious crime," and those who committed
murder during a "rape, robbery, or kidnapping.""8 In 1977, such a law
passed both the House and Senate, only to be vetoed by New York
Governor Hugh Carey." Four years and four vetoes later, the issue
remained electric, this time with New York mayor and gubernatorial
candidate Ed Koch declaring that whether the death penalty deterred or
not, it "is vital that society be allowed to express its moral outrage at
wanton killing.""o In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals entered the
fray and overturned the state's statute requiring capital punishment for
offenders who killed while incarcerated, arguing that the mandatory
death penalty was unconstitutional."'
Despite the court's ruling, popular initiatives to expand the death
penalty continued into the 198os. In 1989, a Democrat-led assembly
voted to restore the penalty in cases of murder-for-hire, murder of police
officers, murder of witnesses, or murder in the course of a "crime that
tol. See infra text accompanying notes 1o7-15.
102. Charles Grutzner, Witnesses Clash on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1968, at 21.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
io6. Id.
io7. Summary of Bills Passed and Killed in Albany During the 1971 Legislative Session, N.Y.
TIMES, June Io, 197 1, at 34.
io8. Thomas Ronan, Biaggi Asks Death for Some Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1973, at 53.
To9. David Bird, Death-Penalty Bill Is Vetoed by Carey, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1977, at AI.
Ito. E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Politics of Death Still Thrive, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1982, at E6.
III. David Margolick, Court Overturns Death Sentence in New York Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1984
at AT.
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threatens many peoples' lives.".. Governor Mario Cuomo vetoed the
law, declaring that even though life had become "ugly and violent" in
New York, capital punishment constituted little more than an "act of
vengeance."".. Frustration with Cuomo's anti-death penalty stance
contributed to the 1994 election of George Elmer Pataki, the state's first
Republican governor in twenty years."4 Pataki campaigned on a promise
to expand the death penalty, something that no New York governor had
done since 1977."' On March 7, 1995, he finally succeeded in reinstating
the electric chair-three decades after the Temporary Commission had
tried to eliminate it-with a new law creating ten separate instances
where death was appropriate."6
Just as the political battle seemed over, the courts intervened. In
2004, New York's highest court invalidated Pataki's law on the grounds
that it unconstitutionally pressured jurors into choosing the death
penalty by warning them that offenders who did not get executed might
be paroled."' Though Pataki moved quickly to amend the statute, he met
stiff resistance in the State Assembly, now controlled by Democrats who
were softening on the issue."' According to Democratic Assemblywoman
Helene Weinstein, initially a supporter of capital punishment, "My vote
io years ago was io years ago."" Since then, argued Weinstein, "new
information, important information, about DNA testing" and "about
innocent people being convicted" had emerged, changing her mind.'2o
Though she did not mention the program by name, Weinstein's allusion
to DNA testing referred to the Innocence Project, a program founded by
law professors Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld to show that a surprising
number of death row inmates were innocent of their crimes.
Battles over the death penalty in New York provide a glimpse into
just how closely popular politics, statutory law, and judicial opinions
operate to influence criminal law reform. Though support for the MPC
remained high in the state, popular politics won out, influencing the
state's treatment of first degree murder. To simply ignore this by
112. Elizabeth Kolbert, Assembly Backs Death Penalty by Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1989,
at B2.
113. Elizabeth Kolbert, Cuomo Vetoes Death Penalty Seventh Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1989, at Bi.
114. Kevin Sack, New York Voters End a Democratic Era, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at As.
115. Id. atBI.
116. James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After i8 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at B5.
I17. William Glaberson, Across New York a Death Penalty Stuck in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2004, at As.
I18. Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to Be Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. II, 2005, at BI.
I19. Id. at B9.
120. Id. at B9.
121. See generally BARRY SCHECK & JIM DWYER, ACrUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS To EXECUTION, AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
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designating New York an MPC state risks occluding the failure of the
Code to overcome local norms and legislative decree.
D. FELONY MURDER
Another area of the MPC roundly rejected by states, but also
related to homicide, was the Code's elimination of felony murder. The
MPC rejected the concept of felony murder, replacing it with homicide
"committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life," a condition that was
"presumed" if the actor was engaged in robbery, rape, arson, burglary, or
kidnapping.'22 Most states refused to follow the MPC on this point,
preserving the separate crime of felony murder.'23
Some states even went so far as to preserve felony murder in cases
where a nonviolent felony was at issue."' This was the case in Missouri-
an MPC state -where literally any felony might trigger the state's felony
murder provision. In 1926, a court found the illegal manufacture of
whiskey to be a sufficient predicate for felony murder,"' and in 1975 the
Supreme Court of Missouri found stealing to be a sufficient predicate
felony.' 6 Also, Missouri considers felonies that actually cause the death
of victims-and are therefore barred from being predicate felonies in
other states due to what is known as the "merger doctrine"-legitimate
triggers for felony murder.2 ' An example occurred in 2001, when a
defendant was successfully charged with felony murder for unlawfully
using a firearm against a victim, the unlawful use of a firearm qualifying
as the underlying felony.28 The State Court of Appeals literally
"abrogated" the merger doctrine, holding that in cases where defendants'
"assaultive acts" resulted in death, those assaultive acts could themselves
be considered predicate felonies. 2 9 Even though this led to an arguably
"absurd result," namely the possibility that someone could be convicted
of "both murder and the assault giving rise to the murder, as a separate
felony," Missouri courts held fast to their new common law rule.3 0
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985).
123. See, e.g., GENE P. SCHULTZ, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN MISSOURI 166 (1986).
124. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 524 S.W. 2d 826, 832 (Mo. 1975); State v. Robinett, 279 S.W. 696,
700-01 (Mo. 1926).
125. Robinett, 279 S.W. at 697, 700.
126. Chambers, 524 S.W. 2d. at 832.
127. State v. Gheen, 41 S.W. 3 d 598, 6oo, 604-o5 (Mo. 2001).
128. Id.
129. ROBERT H. DIERKER, MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES 163-64 (2d ed.
2004).
130. Id.
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E. MODIFICATION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
Almost as unpopular as the MPC's elimination of felony murder
was its modification of the necessity defense."' At common law, necessity
could be invoked in rare cases where a defendant committed a crime to
prevent the occurrence of a greater harm that the defendant did not
herself cause.3' The MPC expanded this defense, allowing defendants to
use it even if they had inadvertently caused the greater harm.'33 The MPC
also allowed the defense to apply to a broad, relatively undefined
number of "harm[s] or evil[s]," opening the door to myriad scenarios that
most courts and legislatures would ultimately reject, including, for
example, allowing for the theft of food in cases where a defendant's
children were hungry.'34 Partly for these reasons, only two of the total
thirty-four MPC states adopted its version."3
Sometimes states adopted the MPC but changed it, adding
provisions that ultimately undermined its strength."36 This was the case in
Illinois, where the state legislature gradually added mental states to the
MPC's purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence formula.' By 2007,
it had added "having reason to know," "reasonably should know,"
"willfully," "maliciously," "fraudulently," and "designedly."' Though
trivial, such modifications ultimately reflected a much larger trend,
namely, a tendency on the part of state legislatures across the country to
alter key provisions of the MPC once it had been adopted. As we have
seen, this emerged in the context not simply of mental states, but of
inchoate offenses, accomplice liability, statutory rape, felony murder,
first degree murder, and necessity. In the next Part, we will see how even
those aspects of the MPC faithfully preserved by state legislators were
manipulated by courts.
III. THE NEW COMMON LAW
While legislative modifications to the MPC are well known, less
studied are efforts that courts have made to alter MPC definitions. Yet
most states that adopted portions of the MPC have almost half a century
131. Michael H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-
Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 191, 196 (2007).
132. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note io, at 289.
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985); Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own
Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. I, 3-4, 8-13, 17-20
(1985).
134. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985); see People v. Fontes, 89 P-3 d 484, 486-87 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003); DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at 565.
135. See Hoffheimer, supra note 131, at 196.
136. See, e.g., Robinson & Cahill, supra note 2, at 640 (describing legislative amendments to
Illinois's criminal code that undermined MPC definitions).
137. Id. at 64o-4i; see also infra Part III.A.
138. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 2, at 640-41.
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of case law interpreting MPC provisions. This new common law remains
one of the least studied aspects of criminal law today, even though it
impacts both the general and special parts of most state criminal codes.
A. MPC CULPABILITY PROVISIONS
One of the MPC's greatest contributions to criminal law is often
considered to be the culpability provisions enumerated in its general
part.'39 Prior to the drafting of the Code, states employed a variety of
poorly defined terms to denote mental state, including malice, mens rea,
willfulness, scienter and "general criminal intent."4 o To clarify what,
precisely, such terms meant, the MPC divided mental state into four
presumably straightforward categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness,
and negligence. 4' Whether a defendant possesses one particular mental
state over another can have significant consequences. For example, if a
defendant "unlawfully confines" a victim with the purpose of facilitating
the commission of a felony, then that defendant could be charged with
kidnapping, a "felony of the first degree," 42 while if she simply restrains
someone, the appropriate charge would be false imprisonment, a
misdemeanor."4
Yet as precise as the MPC's delineations of mens rea are, state
courts across the country have done much to muddy them, allowing
jurors to impose culpability on defendants regardless of their actual
thoughts. The primary vehicle for this has been a common law rule that a
defendant's mental state can be imputed through the "natural and
probable consequences" of her actions.'" While Wechsler recognized
that such a doctrine may be "the only way of proving intent" in some
cases, he bridled at judicial overuse of the theory, particularly in cases
where jurors were given a choice between possible mental states.' 45
"Since a particular crime must actually be intended," warned Wechsler,
"the charge must be precise and must not permit the jury to convict the
actor on one of several mental states."4 6 Yet this is precisely what courts
across the country have done: reduce the MPC's narrow tailoring of
139. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 269 (2o02); Holley, supra note 2o, at
3o; Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815,
815 (1980).
140. DRESSLER, CASES, supra note 4, at 161.
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY (1985).
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1: KIDNAPPING & § 212.2: FELONIOUS RESTRAINT (1985).
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (1985).
144. See, e.g., People v. Coolidge, 187 N.E.2d. 694, 697 (Ill. 1963); State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d 399,
405 (Me. 1984) (recognizing natural and probable consequences doctrine); Jennings v. State, No.
W2007-oo87 -CCA-R 3 -PC, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 88o, at *ii (Oct. 21, 2oo9); State v. Wheeler,
414 N.W.2d. 318, I (Wis. 1987).
145. See Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 571,576 (1961).
146. Id.
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mental states to a loose menu of options that jurors can pick and choose
from to get a conviction.'47
New York provides an example. "After an all-night St. Patrick's
Day Celebration," a former New York City Police officer shot and killed
one of his colleagues.4'" Though the officer could not explain or even
remember why he killed his victim, he was charged with intentional
murder (second degree in New York), depraved heart murder (requiring
the lower mental state of extreme recklessness), and, at the judge's
request, "manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of
intentional murder, and manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser
included offense of depraved heart murder." 49 Just as Wechsler warned,
jurors found themselves suddenly able to choose from a smorgasbord of
mental states, undermining the MPC's imperative that a defendant's
state of mind be matched with a single crime.' 0
Accomplice liability marks another area where courts have tended
to veer away from the MPC's culpability provisions. While the MPC
makes it clear that an accomplice needs the mental state of purpose,
thereby rejecting the natural and probable consequences rule, courts in
several states have gone the other way, allowing mental states to be
imputed based on the natural and probable consequences of the
accomplice's actions.'' Even states that initially came out against
applying the natural and probable consequences doctrine to accomplices
have since developed new, judicially created parallel theories that
accomplish the same end.' For example, just as Missouri courts declared
that they would not impute mental state based on the natural and
probable consequences of an accomplice's actions, so did new courts
147. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(declaring the constitutionality of permissive inference that persons intend natural and probable
consequences of their actions); United States v. Martin, 772 F.2d 1442, 1445 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming
jury's conclusion that defendant made false statements to the government, even though the
government official to whom he made the statements knew they were false); United States v. Cotton,
770 F.2d 940, 946 (iith Cir. 1985) (upholding jury instructions permitting but not requiring jurors to
infer that a person intends the natural consequences of his actions); United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d
373, 373 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); People v. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909, 909 (N.Y. 1987) ("[Wlhere a
defendant is charged with a single homicide, in an indictment containing one count of intentional
murder and one count of depraved mind murder, both counts may be submitted to the jury, but only in
the alternative.").
148. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d. at 909.
149. Id. at 9io.
150. Wechsler et al., supra note 145, at 576.
151. People v. Houston, 629 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1o67,
io69 n.2 (Me. 1987); see also Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 617 n.24
(1984) (describing how some courts allow jurors to impute mental states to aiders and abettors).
152. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 953 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Mills, 809
S.W.2d I, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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hold that a defendant is responsible for "those crimes which he could
reasonably anticipate would be a part of that conduct."' 3
B. MURDER
Other common law rules survived in so-called MPC states as well,
dramatically altering many of the MPC's provisions. Again, murder in
New York provides an example. At common law, defendants who
intentionally killed their victims could assert a partial defense if they
suffered from a heat of blood or passion or were "greatly provoked."'
Classic common law examples of such provocation included mutual
combat brought on by a "sudden quarrel," catching "another in the act of
adultery with [one's] wife," and retaliation for having one's "nose
pulled."' The defense could be claimed so long as the defendant did not
have "sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to
interpose.", 6
To distinguish itself from the common law, the MPC rejected the
language of sudden passion, opting instead for "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance."' Pursuant to this language, the Code did not
require "that the actor's emotional distress" come from "some injury,
affront, or other provocative act perpetrated upon him by the
deceased.""" Instead, it did away with "a host of more or less hard and
fast common law rules defining the scope of the provocation defense."'
As it did away with such rules, however, the MPC also failed to provide
clear guidance on what, precisely, constituted extreme emotional
disturbance. This left a considerable amount of interpretation, if not
outright law creation, up to New York courts.
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v.
Patterson, an early case involving the extreme emotional disturbance
defense, noting that "[t]he opportunity opened for mitigation differs
significantly from the traditional heat of passion defense."'6 Citing the
MPC Commentaries, the court asserted that the new emotional
disturbance language did not limit the defense to instances where "a
defendant, provoked, acts 'under the influence of some sudden and
uncontrollable emotion."" 6 ' To elaborate, the court abandoned the old
requirement that no cooling time could pass between the provocation
and the act, holding instead that precisely because "a significant mental
153. Mills, 809 S.W.2d at 3-4; see also Anderson, 953 S.W.2d at 647.
154. BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 207, 214.
155. Id. at 214.
156. Id.
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1985).
158. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 5 at 61.
159. DUBBER, supra note 139, at 269.
i6o. 347 N.E.2d 898, 9o7 (N.Y. 1976).
161. Id. at 906.
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trauma" might have influenced the defendant's thought processes "for a
substantial period of time," any length of time could pass and the
defendant could still claim the defense.62
Precisely because New York's Penal Code made no mention of
cooling time, Patterson quickly became legal doctrine in the Empire
State. Four years later, the New York Court of Appeals again dealt with
an emotional disturbance case, citing Patterson as evidence of the
"distinction between the past and present law of mitigation.""' The court
in People v. Casassa asserted that in Patterson, an act arising from
extreme emotional disturbance did not have to be "spontaneously
undertaken.""' On the contrary, "it may be that a significant mental
trauma has affected a defendant's mind for a substantial period of time,
simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming
to the fore."'65
Even as Casassa cited Patterson for the new common law rule that
cooling time did not apply, so too did Casassa develop a rule of its own,
namely that the emotional disturbance in question had to have an
objectively reasonable explanation.'" This holding settled an ambiguity
in the statutory language of the MPC, which provided a mitigating
defense so long as the "defendant acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."' 7 Though the
statute's call to focus on circumstances "as the defendant believed them
to be" could be read as a subjective standard, the court found an equally
plausible, objective reading. "Whether the language of this statute
requires a completely subjective evaluation of reasonableness," mused
Judge Jasen, "is a question that has never been decided by this court."'
Conceding that the MPC hoped to do away with "the rigid rules that
have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular types of
provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never be enough," the
court held firm to the view that "[t]he ultimate test, however, is
objective."'6
Over the course of the next two decades, the New York Court of
Appeals assembled a collection of cases illustrating precisely how and
when the defense of extreme emotional disturbance might apply-all
162. Id. at 908.
163. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1314-15 (N.Y. 1980).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1314.
166. Id. at 1316.
167. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (2011).
168. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d at 1316.
169. Id.
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arguably necessary reading for students interested in comprehending the
doctrine. To take just a few examples, the court held that an instruction
was not warranted in a case where a victim put his hand on a defendant's
plate of food,o but was warranted when a victim mocked a defendant's
inability to get an erection, overturning the traditional rule that words
alone could not constitute provocation."' Indeed, judicial interpretations
of what did and did not constitute sufficient provocation provided
something of a crystal ball into community norms in New York,
distinguishing actions that impugned cultural artifices like masculinity
from mere annoyances.
Though criminal law casebooks often cite classic common law
examples of provocation-mutual combat, catching spouses in bed with
others, and so on-none discuss the manner in which courts have created
new categories of voluntary manslaughter that coincide with the MPC.
Nor, for that matter, do casebooks explain how courts in MPC states
have actually resurrected older categories that undermine the Code."'
For example, even though the Arkansas legislature adopted the MPC's
"extreme emotional disturbance" language, Arkansas courts quickly
took the doctrine in a very different direction from the Empire State,
returning it to its pre-MPC guise."' Rather than follow New York's
abandonment of old, common law terms like provocation, Arkansas
judges re-inserted provocation into its new defense. 4 "We have held
repeatedly," noted the Arkansas Supreme Court in 2005, "that, in order
for a jury to be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance
manslaughter, there must be evidence that the defendant killed the
victim in the moment following some kind of provocation, such as
'physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon."""
Further, Arkansas adopted the long-standing rule that the killing
had to occur before a significant cooling time could pass, a point rejected
by the MPC."' Even though Arkansas continued to use the term
"extreme emotional disturbance," state courts had effectively resurrected
the old common law provocation defense. This, ironically, was the new
common law rediscovering old forms.
170. People v. Walker, 475 N.E.2d 445,445-46 (N.Y. 1984).
171. People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736,738-39 (N.Y. 1985).
172. See, e.g., DUBBER & KELMAN, supra note 4, at 174 ("While the judiciary today retains a
'common law' power of adjudication that discretion is limited to the interpretation of legislatures'
criminal codes (and criminal statues strewn throughout other codes).").
173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-to-to4(a)(I)(A) (2oo6).
174. Boyle v. State, 2t4 SM.-3 d 250, 253 (Ark. 2005) (quoting Kail v. State, 14 S.W. 3 d 878, 881
(Ark. 2002)).
175. Id.
176. Kail v. State, 14 S.W.3d 878, 88o-8, (Ark. 2002).
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C. RAPE
Other examples of judicial law creation emerged in Pennsylvania.
After joining the MPC in eliminating the language of consent from its
rape statute, for example, Pennsylvania reduced rape to instances where
defendants engaged in sexual intercourse "by forcible compulsion."'
State courts then proceeded to enumerate a variety of circumstances not
anticipated by the MPC in which forcible compulsion might apply. To
take just a few examples, Pennsylvania courts found forcible compulsion
when a defendant who enjoyed his victim's trust and confidence
employed emotional exploitation',8 and when a father employed
psychological coercion by engaging in sexual intercourse with his
daughter after showing her sexually explicit photographs.'" Neither case
involved either the use or threat of force, indicating that courts were
pushing the law of rape in new directions, away from MPC and common
law rules rooted in resistance and towards standards more sensitive to
disparate power relations. Along these lines, Pennsylvania courts also
found forcible compulsion when a therapist abused his authority over a
patient'S and an uncle abused his authority over his niece.'a
Even as Pennsylvania courts augmented the force rule, other states
developed judicial innovations in the law of rape as well. In Missouri, a
court relaxed the force requirement for rape where the defendant was a
counselor who used his position of authority over the victim, threatening
to ruin her chances of obtaining a job if she did not comply with his
sexual requests. 8' Applying a "totality of the circumstances test," the
court cited prior case law focusing less on whether the victim resisted
physically and more on "the atmosphere and setting of the incident,"
including whether the defendant exercised "domination and control of
the victim."'' Citing even more nonstatutory, new common law, the
court continued that even threats that had nothing to do with physical
violence, such as a threat to remove custody of children, could be taken
into account in a rape allegation.' All of the above point to the manner
in which statutory law, including law modeled after the MPC, can evolve
through judicial interpretation, sometimes resulting in significant
modifications of code provisions.
177. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West Supp. 2011).
178. Commonwealth v. Ables, 590 A.2d 334,338 (Pa. i99i).
179. Commonwealth v. Ruppert, 579 A.2d 966, 969 (Pa. 90).
18o. Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 619 (Pa. 1990).
181. Commonwealth v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757 (1988).
182. State v. Spencer, 50 S.W. 3 d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Id. at 873 (citing State v. Kilmartin, 904 S.W.2d 370,374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
184. Id. at 875 (citing State v. Dee, 752 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
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D. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
Just as Missouri and Pennsylvania courts altered the MPC's law of
rape, other states altered the MPC's approach to accomplice liability.
Across the river from Missouri, for example, Illinois courts retained the
merger doctrine but revised the MPC's accomplice liability language.
While the MPC made it clear that the natural and probable
consequences of one party's actions could not be used to implicate
others, Illinois courts found an alternate rule that achieved a similar
end.' Rather than natural and probable consequences, Illinois judges
turned to a judicially constructed doctrine known as the "common design
rule" that held "where two or more persons engage in a common
criminal design," then "any acts in furtherance thereof committed by one
party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design.'
Though reminiscent of the MPC's conspiracy language, the doctrine
actually lent itself to a dramatic reformulation of accomplice liability,
particularly because "the State need only prove the accused had the
specific intent to promote or facilitate a crime."'8 For example, in People
v. Taylor, the defendant agreed to participate in a robbery only to
discover that one of his accomplices secretly intended to shoot the
victim.189 While under the MPC the defendant would not have been held
responsible for a crime he did not anticipate, the Illinois appellate court
held explicitly that it was not necessary for the prosecution "to prove the
accused had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the crime with
which he is charged."" Instead, all the State had to show was that the
accomplices had agreed to commit "a crime," meaning any crime that
might be framed as part of a common plan. 9'
While Illinois adopted the common design rule, Maine courts
modified the MPC in another way, by resurrecting natural and probable
consequences as a way of establishing accomplice liability.'92 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sanctioned this approach in State v.
Linscott, a 1987 case involving the conviction of an accomplice who
claimed to lack the requisite mental state for murder.'93 According to the
defendant, he joined three other men in what he believed was going to be
the robbery of a local cocaine dealer, only to learn that one of his
accomplices secretly planned to murder the victim.'94 Though the court
185. People v. Houston, 629 N.E.2d 774,779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 557 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ill. 1990).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. State v. Linscott, 52o A.2d 1o67, roo (Me. 198 7 )-
193. Id. at io68.
194. Id.
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believed defendant lacked the requisite intent for murder, it nevertheless
invoked the doctrine of "foreseeable consequence[s]," holding that
mental state could be imputed based on the natural and probable
consequences of defendant's actions, and a probable consequence of an
armed robbery was murder." While the MPC expressly rejected such an
approach, and Maine otherwise adopted much of the MPC, this
particular provision marked a departure from the code by state courts.
Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the MPC's
definition of conspiracy. While the Missouri legislature adopted the MPC
requirement that overt acts be required to establish all but the most
serious of conspiracies, Missouri courts quickly loosened this
requirement to include the absence of action. For example, in a 1984 case
State v. Mace, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
held that while proof must be adduced that an overt act occurred, there
was actually "no requirement" that such an act be "physical."'6 Indeed,
the court even went so far as to hold that mere silence counted as an
overt act, rendering the rule nearly meaningless.'"
Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the MPC's
definition of knowledge. While the Code limited knowledge to instances
where a defendant is "practically certain" that his conduct will produce a
certain result, the appellate court for the Western District of Missouri
expanded this definition in State v. Johnston to include a defendant who
shot his best friend after pointing and firing what he believed to be an
empty handgun at him.' Prior to the killing, the defendant welcomed
the victim to his home, "talked, joked, and laughed" with him, and then
accepted the victim's offer to inspect a handgun that the victim had
concealed under his shirt.'" The defendant emptied several rounds from
the gun's chamber and, believing the gun to be empty, pointed it in jest at
his friend and pulled the trigger three times, killing him on the third.oo
Though the defendant's conduct indicated that he did not actually know
the gun was loaded, and therefore was negligent, the Missouri court
presumed that the defendant and the victim were engaged in a game of
"chicken" and that the defendant therefore knew he would kill his friend
when he pulled the trigger.2o' However, even if the defendant had been
engaged in a game of chicken, this does not necessarily mean that he
knew he was going to kill his friend. At best, he knew there was a
substantial risk that he might kill his friend, rendering his mental state
one of recklessness. After all, while the MPC provides for a finding of
195. Id. at lo7o.
196. 682 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
197. Id.
198. 868 S.w.2d 226, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 228.
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knowledge where a defendant "is aware of a high probability" that
something exists,o2 this expansion is obviated in cases where a defendant
"actually believes that it does not exist," as the defendant in Johnston
likely did when firing a gun at his best friend. Perhaps eager to deter
citizens of Missouri from engaging in similar games in the future, the
appellate court sanctioned a substantial departure from the MPC's
definition of knowledge, allowing the jury to find knowledge in cases
where defendants at best were aware of a risk.2 o3
In a manner that only highlights the extent to which courts
employed "new" common law rules to transform the MPC, Missouri
courts took a very different-but arguably equally heretical-tack in
cases that involved defendants who implausibly maintained that they
were not aware of the age of certain minors who joined them in criminal
activity.2 4 For example, in State v. Hopkins, a Missouri appellate court
ignored the MPC's definition of knowledge and concluded that a
defendant who purchased alcohol for a twelve-year-old and proceeded to
drink alcohol with that twelve-year-old in his car was not guilty of second
degree child endangerment.2 o' Though the MPC's definition of
knowledge-which the Missouri legislature adopted-clearly allowed for
a conviction in such a case where a defendant was at the very least
"aware of a high probability" that a certain attendant circumstance was
true, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri held that
the State had to prove that the defendant actually knew the victim was
under seventeen.o6 In arriving at this holding, the Eastern District relied
on an earlier case that also let a defendant go free for not checking the
age of a minor.'" In that case, State v. Nations, the defendant hired a
sixteen-year-old to dance at a nightclub without checking her age.'8
Though convicted at the trial level for "knowingly" endangering the
welfare of a child "less than seventeen years old," the appellate court
reversed," marking a dramatic departure from the Western District's
holding in the "game of chicken" case that the defendant knew he had
shot his best friend even though he had emptied several rounds from the
chamber. Obviously, both the shooter and the endangerer knew there
was some probability their conduct might lead to a criminal result, yet
the new common law treated the two types of defendants differently.
Why? Perhaps Missouri courts wanted to send a stronger signal to those
202. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985).
203. Johnston, 868 S.W.2d at 228.
204. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 873 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nations, 676
s.w.2d 282, 285-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
205. 873 S.w.2d at 911-12.
206. Id. at 912.
207. Id.
208. 676 S.w.2d at 283, 285-86.
209. Id. at 286.
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who toyed with lethal weapons than those who drank alcohol with
children. Or perhaps Missouri courts wanted to signal to parents that
they, and not the law, were ultimately responsible for supervising their
progeny. Regardless of the precise reason, Missouri's new common law
dramatically complicated the MPC's otherwise straightforward definition
of knowledge.
Far from being an outlier, Missouri proved representative of nearly
all thirty-four states that adopted the MPC.1 o In each of these states,
courts stepped in after the Code was adopted and altered key
provisions.2" Such alterations-or what this Article calls new common
law-are largely ignored in the literature but, as we shall see in the next
Part, theoretically significant.
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Criminal law scholars tend to downplay the significance of cases to
understanding criminal law."' Such animosity is nothing new, and in fact
dates back to a surge of frustration with the common law that peaked in
the 193os."' At the forefront of such critiques were legal realist scholars
like Karl Llewellyn who believed that law should reflect social realities -
not ancient doctrines-and should rely on empirical studies in social
science for guidance.214 Though Llewellyn concentrated his reform efforts
on rationalizing commercial law, his general animosity towards the
common law was shared by scholars in the criminal law realm as well,
including Wechsler.215 To Wechsler's mind, the common law actually
contributed to a narrow judicial mindset that threatened Roosevelt's
early, ambitious New Deal programs.
When Wechsler and Michael wrote their criminal law casebook,
they deliberately reduced the number of cases in their book, substituting
in their place extensive notes that drew from law review articles,
210. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 81.
211. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 81.
212. Donald A. Dripps, On Cases, Casebooks, and the Real World of Criminal Justice: A Brief
Response to Anders Walker, 7 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 257 (2009); Angela P. Harris & Cynthia Lee,
Teaching Criminal Law from a Critical Perspective, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIm. L. 261, 263-64 (2oo9); Douglas
Husak, Criminal Law Textbooks and Human Betterment, 7 OHIo ST. J. Clum. L. 267, 270 (2o09); Lloyd
L. Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 282 (2009); Robert Weisberg, Did
Legal Realism Engage the Real World of Criminal Law?, 7 Omo ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 298-99 (2009).
213. Walker, Anti-Case Method, supra note 61, at 238-39.
214. Allen R. Kamp, Between-The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the
Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 327 (1995). For a study of one scholar who
influenced legal realism, see Monica Eppinger, Governing in the Vernacular: Eugen Ehrlich and Late
Habsburg Ethnography, in LIVING LAw: RECONSIDERING EUGEN EHRLICH 21-22 (Marc Hertogh ed.,
2009).
215. Walker, Anti-Case Method, supra note 61, at 218.
2 16. Id.
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philosophical treatises, and social science studies.2 " To Wechsler's mind,
such an approach helped to produce a new kind of student, one liberated
from the "closed-system" approach of the common law, and eager to
think critically about the manner in which social science could contribute
to radical legal reform."
Wechsler received an invitation from the ALI to serve as the MPC's
Reporter in part because of the success of his casebook, as the Code was
to draw heavily from advances in social science to reform ancient
common law doctrines."' Wechsler and Michael had already sought ways
to improve such doctrines, particularly in the law of homicide, hoping to
rationalize redundancies, tailor sentencing, and clarify confusing
common law rules.o Over the course of the next decade, from 1952 to
1962, the ALI relied on a series of experts to reform almost every area of
criminal law, substituting the common law's traditional emphasis on
retribution and community conscience with a more scientific emphasis on
treatment and the reduction of criminal harm.' Though Wechsler
himself retained an interest in the utility of desert,2 many of the Code's
new provisions reflected a very different approach, located far from local
community sentiment, usages, and customs."
Though at first glance similar to Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), the MPC's rejection of local custom made it and the UCC
profoundly different. Despite his interest in modernism, for example,
Llewellyn kept local custom at the center of his mind, staying true to the
realist maxim that legal reform should draw inspiration not from abstract
principles but from "the trials of experience." 22 4 Though just as opposed
to the common law as Wechsler, in other words, Llewellyn retained an
appreciation for the fact that judge-made law also included within it
significant "folk artifacts," and useful "working rules" that had "proven
their worth over time.""' This led him to articulate a distinction between
the "grand" or valuable portions of the common law, from the less
valuable "formal" aspects.226 To Llewellyn's mind, it was the legislator's
job to "take the good, practical folkways" of the common law, meanwhile
rejecting its "outmoded" facets.227
217. See id. at 219.
218. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.
219. Walker, Anti-Case Method, supra note 61, at 237.
220. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 701, 702, 706 n.19 (1937)-
221. DUBBER, supra note 79, at 7-11.
222. See infra notes 257-6o and accompanying text.
223. See generally Walker, American Oresteia, supra note 94.
224. Kamp, supra note 214, at 332.
225. Id. at 335.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 335-36.
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Central to Llewellyn's belief in the value of folkways was the
discipline of anthropology, a field that inspired one of his best known
works, The Cheyenne Way."' In that book, Llewellyn extolled those
aspects of tribal behavior that reflected sensible practices developed
from the ground up, arguing that written law worked best when it
tracked local custom."9 To Llewellyn's mind, the business community
reflected another type of tribe, like the Cheyenne, that had established
its own customs governing commercial transactions, an insight that
guided his preparation of the UCC.230
By contrast, the drafters of the MPC downplayed the significance of
folkways in criminal law reform.' Rather than presume that criminal law
should be "what judges do"-a Realist maxim-the ALI drafters spent
considerable amounts of time focused on what judges had done wrong,
and what real, expert-driven reform should look like.' Though Wechsler
kept custom in mind, the inspiration for much of the MPC lay not in local
practice but behavioral science: psychological and sociological work done
on treatment-oriented goals such as rehabilitation and deterrence.'
The MPC's break from the common law sparked a sea-change in
criminal law pedagogy as scholars moved to present the MPC not as an
evolved form of the common law, or even a repository for the best of
common law rules, but a rational, ultimately superior alternative.234 Not
long after the MPC was completed, for example, a new generation of
criminal law scholars led by Kadish began drafting casebooks heavily
influenced by Wechsler and Michael, even to the point that they included
the MPC at the end of their books as an example of a rational code that
could be compared to archaic common law.23S Once states began to adopt
portions of the MPC, criminal law scholars then began to divide the
country into two kinds of states: those that adopted the MPC, and the
rest.236 Underlying this practice was, of course, a larger set of normative,
even political, assumptions about the nature of criminal law generally. To
228. Id.
229. See generally K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
230. Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 621, 622-27 (1975); Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201 (i9i). In
thinking about codifying commercial law, Llewellyn drew inspiration from turn-of-the-century
anthropologist William Graham Sumner, who posited that "folkways," or local practices, were always
more powerful than "law ways," or written rules. See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY
OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 261 (1940).
231. Walker, American Oresteia, supra note 94, at 1017.
232. Kamp, supra note 214, at 355; see also DUBBER, supra note 79, at 7-II; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 1-44 (1986).
233. DUBBER, supra note 79, at 7-11.
234. See Kadish, supra note 75, at 521.
235. MONRAD PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS X-Xi (1962).
236. MONRAD PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (2d ed. 1965).
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the younger, reform-minded generation, MPC states were in fact more
progressive, more scientific, and less likely to cave to popular demands231for retribution and revenge. Such states inspired the hope that a
rational criminal code could be implemented across the country, one that
ignored irrational calls for increased punishment, execution, and
redundant offenses.238
Yet between innovations in behavioral science and legal change
rested an entire strata of thought far removed from the realm of rational
inquiry, a realm that Lawrence Friedman has since called "popular legal
culture"2 39 inhabited by "popular ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions"240
regarding what the law is. To their own detriment, devotees of the MPC
did not consider the importance of popular legal culture to be central.24'
One of the best examples of this was the failure of MPC proponents
Kadish and Herbert Packer to reform California's penal code.242 Asked
by California's Joint Legislative Committee to improve criminal law in
the Golden State, Kadish and Packer spent several years on the drafting
of a new criminal code, importing many of the innovations recommended
by the MPC.243 Though many such reforms would likely have passed
legislative muster, Kadish and Packer endorsed several changes that flew
in the face of customary criminal law in California, including the
decriminalization of certain sexual behaviors, the expansion of the
insanity defense, and the liberalization of marijuana laws.2" When
members of California's Advisory Board read the Committee's
recommendation that possession and sale of less than one pound of
marijuana be considered a misdemeanor, for example, they reacted "with
such emotional indignation that all avenues for a thoughtful interchange
of points of view were quickly closed."245 Not long thereafter, "the acting
project director was informed by telephone that the chairman of the
Joint Legislative Committee had discharged all of the members of the
staff and ordered the project halted at once."4 6 Though Kadish and
Packer wrote a letter protesting the decision, no new Committee was
237. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst
(And Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. I (2000).
238. Id.
239. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L. J. 1579, 1597 (989).
240. Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice: Law, Culture, and Society, 4o BULL. Am. ACAD. ARTs &
Sc. 24, 28 (1986).
241. Id. at 29.
242. See Arthur H. Sherry, Criminal Law Revision in California, 4 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 429, 434-
35 (197); Interview with Sanford H. Kadish in Berkeley, Cal. (May 19, 2008) (on file with Author).
243. Sherry, supra note 242, at 434-37; Interview with Kadish, supra note 242.
244. Sherry, supra note 242, at 434-49.
245. Id. at 439-4o.
246. Id. at 441.
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appointed and California's criminal code remained largely unchanged for
the remainder of the twentieth century.247
Though Kadish later blamed "conservatives" for killing criminal law
reform in California, he did little to make sure that the Committee's
suggestions were in line with what most voters believed, even confessing
that the academic members of the staff ran the Committee meetings as
"post-graduate seminars."24' Had Kadish and his colleagues approached
such seminars in a more anthropological way, focusing on the local
norms of California voters, they might have been able to develop
strategic concessions -much like Wechsler did in New York-saving
reform.249
Kadish's failure in California underscores the importance of
conveying the link between culture and criminal law to students. Though
liberalizing marijuana laws may have appeared uncontroversial at the
time, code reformers failed to accurately assess the power of conservative
politics in California in the 196os, undoubtedly substituting liberal
positions on marijuana use common in Berkeley and Palo Alto for more
conservative positions in rural, working-class demographics across the
state.2so Further, code reformers may have fared better had they
remained more closely attuned to trends in state politics, particularly a
pronounced shift towards conservatism mid-decade, as voters recoiled at
urban rioting, antiwar protest, and Berkeley's filthy free-speech
movement."'
While criminal law courses can probably never incorporate the full
scope of state and local politics into their syllabi, methods of emphasizing
the link between criminal law and culture nevertheless remain.' For
example, one way to convey the link between law and culture is to delve
into the particulars of state law, showing how certain states adopted
portions of the MPC but rejected others.' Another is to look at courts,
focusing on how judicial opinions modified those sections of the MPC
that were adopted. True to its anthropological bent, the drafters of the
UCC did just this, setting apart a special organ for publishing judicial
247. Letter from Sanford H. Kadish, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley & Herbert L.
Packer, Professor of Law, Stanford Univ., to Senator Donald L. Grunsky (Sept. 24, 1969), in Letters,
22 STAN. L. REV. 16o, 161-63 (1969).
248. Interview with Kadish, supra note 242.
249. Walker, American Oresteia, supra note 94, at 1041-51-
250. See generally JAMES T. CAREY, THE COLLEGE DRUG SCENE (1968) (exploring the meaning and
significance of drug use by college age youth around Berkeley in the 1960s); JAY STEVENS, STORMING
HEAVEN: LSD AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1988).
251. See GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME 288-305 (1978); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, DON'T
SHOOT-WE ARE YOUR CHILDREN! 447-61 (1971) (compiling ten biographies about the generation that
came of age in the middle and late sixties).
252. Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching Criminal Law or Leaving the Common
Law and the MPC Behind, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 167, 168 (2010).
253. Id.
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modifications of the MPC.254 However, nothing similar exists for the
MPC, leaving most students blind to the manner in which it has
interacted with local cultures. This has led to a problem that
anthropologist Clifford Geertz identified with top-down, philosophical
approaches to studying society generally, namely the problem with
extracting "the general from the particular" and then setting the
particular "aside as detail, illustration, background, or qualification."2 5 5
To Geertz, such moves yield a relatively narrow understanding of "the
very difference we need to explore.2S
Geertz's attention to local difference warrants closer thought by
criminal law scholars and teachers. This is because students suffer at least
two distinct harms when they are not provided with a clear view of how
local culture impacts criminal law, including the MPC. First, failing to
instruct students on judicial modifications of the MPC, or what this
Article calls the new common law, renders students less prone to
understanding what, precisely, the law forbids, a problem that scholars
such as Robinson have argued is a serious concern.5 Second, failing to
instruct students on the new common law prevents them from seeing the
critical role that criminal law-making can play in quieting community
outrage, a phenomenon that criminal law scholars call the utility of
desert.25" Though scholars revile redundant criminal provisions, for
example, such provisions are often important responses to particular
moments of community outrage. 259 As scholars Paul Robinson and
Michael Cahill note, for example, "If there is a series of drive-by
shootings, or a particularly scary home invasion case, or some
carjackings, a common response is to create special offenses for each of
these particular kinds of conduct, even though they are already fully
criminalized and, where possible, prosecuted."'6c While both Robinson
and Cahill find such behavior reprehensible, even they agree that the
public is affected by such moves, arguably precluding average voters
from doing even more serious damage.1
What, skeptics might ask, might voters do? Citizens deprived of
immediate responses to gruesome crimes may retaliate by electing tough-
254. Frier, supra note 230, at 2203.
255. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AFrER THE FACT: Two COUNTRIES, FOUR DECADES, ONE ANTHROPOLOGIST 40
(1995).
256. Id.
257. Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729,
731 (1990).
258. Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 358-59
(1983). See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1997).
259. See generally Robinson & Darley, supra note 258.
26o. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can A Model Penal Code Second Save the States from
Themselves, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 171 (2003).
261. Id. at 170-71.
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on-crime representatives who end up imposing harsher penalties on all
offenders.262 Outraged citizens may also refuse to channel public funds
into the defense of the accused, a serious problem for public defenders
across the United States.263 Though downplayed by criminal law scholars,
in other words, the problem of voter outrage might actually be one of the
most serious yet underestimated forces acting on America's criminal
justice system even today.
CONCLUSION
Though criminal law scholars continue to divide American
jurisdictions into MPC and common law states, it is not clear that such
divisions retain any real pedagogical value. As this Article has shown, no
state in the Union continues to follow the ancient common law of
England, nor does any state exist without a criminal code. Indeed, out of
the fourteen states that did not adopt the MPC-a move that has since
relegated them into the common law category-none adhere to anything
that might remotely be called English common law.
As we have seen, all common law states have long since codified
their criminal law, reserving the enforcement of ancient common law
crimes to "reception statutes."'24 Yet the use of such statutes is
exceedingly rare, confined to idiosyncratic, nineteenth-century-era
offenses like "being a common scold," and "burning a body in a cellar
furnace.""26 Archaic at best, these types of offenses hardly warrant the
sustained attention of first-year law students.
Even the argument that certain states codified common law terms is
hardly a justification for continuing the common law divide. As this
Article illustrates, most states have legislatively altered what might once
have been considered common law offenses, creating an entirely new
form of American criminal law. The impact of uniquely American
cultural influences on this criminal law is perhaps one of the greatest
reasons for ending the mythology of the common law state. Further,
understanding the manner in which such local cultures impact criminal
262. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 22 (2oo7).
263. See, e.g., Editorial, Limping Along, ST. LoUis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 2007, at Clo; Editorial,
Rights on the Verge of Collapse, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2oo6, at B2. Redundant codes may
also provide opportunities to do justice. For example, prosecutors in Missouri have the opportunity to
charge defendants suspected of attempted killing with one of two crimes, either attempted murder or
first degree assault. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.02o-565.024, 565.050 (20o). Here, an attempted
murder charge actually brings with it a lower penalty, meaning that prosecutors could satisfy
community outrage by mentioning murder, meanwhile reducing the penalty to sympathetic defendants
by charging attempted murder. See id.
264. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 1o, at 66.
265. Id. at 67.
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law is considerably more important to students than regurgitations of lost
common law doctrines.
Just as the notion of the common law state has been increasingly
anachronistic, so too has the conceit of the MPC jurisdiction. Though
thirty-six states adopted portions of the MPC, no state adopted all of it.
Further, even those states that adopted significant sections of the Code
still retained key aspects of their old law, particularly those that reflected
local values. Arbiters of such values proved to be both legislative drafters
and courts, the latter employing the power of judicial interpretation to
align MPC provisions with local law.
Secreted over almost a fifty-year period from 1962 to 2010, judicial
modifications of MPC rules embody nothing less than a new common
law. That casebooks and treatises do not focus on this law is mystifying.
However, even the most pro-MPC criminal law theorists have begun to
doubt the continued relevance of the Code. According to criminal law
scholar Markus Dubber, an ALI enthusiast, the MPC "belongs to a
bygone era of American penal law."26 Built on the twin theories of
deterrence and treatment, Dubber continues, the Code "no longer enjoys
the broad consensus it might have in the 1950s.",267
Indeed it does not. Though criminal law casebooks continue to
present the MPC as an innovative, recent reform, it is rapidly
approaching its fiftieth birthday. At its inception half a century ago, it
dovetailed nicely with prevailing trends towards modernism in law-a
Benthamite moment during which rationality and science eclipsed
history and anthropology.'6 However, the devolution of the MPC in the
latter half of the twentieth century suggests that history and culture may
be regaining lost ground.6 Indeed, the very criticisms of state codes
advanced by scholars-that they are incoherent, sedimentary, even
redundant-only confirm the Burkean critique of Bentham, namely that
law itself cannot be understood by logical principles and scientific rules
but requires a close study of the history and culture of a particular
society.7 o
Judicial opinions and state statutes provide just such a study.
Though Dubber has declared that "[t]he age of the common penal law is
over," and that "[p]enal law is now made in codes by legislators, not in
court opinions by judges,"2.. even a cursory look at the manner in which
266. Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 53,54 (2ooo).
267. Id. at 53.
268. DUBBER, supra note 79, at 7- I.
269. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link Between Law and Culture,
55 U. Cm. L. REv. 450,456-57 (1988).
270. Id. at 450.
271. Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. Cuim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50
(1999)-
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courts have modified MPC provisions, or what this Article calls the "new
common law," suggests this is incorrect. In fact, criminal law may be
enjoying a renascence of new common law principles. While the
midpoint of the twentieth century witnessed a spike in modernist
thought, of which the MPC was a product, the twenty-first century looks
to be a much different era, marked by a return to "historical and
prescriptive modes of thought.""' Perhaps the biggest example of this is
the recent surge of interest in empirical legal studies, an anti-
philosophical inquiry bent on understanding the law as it is, not as it
might or even should be.273
Some of the MPC's most fervent supporters understood this. As
much as Wechsler resisted the common law, for example, he never lost
sight of local community norms and local, cultural values. While serving
on New York's Temporary Commission to revise its Penal Law in 1963,
Wechsler consistently prodded the Commission to consider local
attitudes. 4 Wechsler's concern that criminal law coincide with
community values is often lost in criminal law courses, particularly as
teachers struggle to maintain the false dichotomy between common law
and MPC states. Setting aside this dichotomy is vital if criminal law
scholars want to bring the course back to earth for their students.
Currently, simple comparisons between MPC and common law states
obscure the manner in which statutory law and case law intertwine, even
as they leave students missing the close relationship between criminal
codes and local norms. By contrast, focusing on the new common law
enables students to see how even the most scientific of codes ultimately
finds itself bending, and being bent, to suit judicial will.
One final point is worth mentioning. Though the impact of popular
will on criminal statutes has been criticized by law scholars like Robinson
and Stuntz, criminal law's close tie to popular democracy remains
unavoidable."' Not emphasizing this to students can lead to dire results,
among them a tendency to downplay the significance of local voters, and
also to miss important cultural formations that may or may not make
certain litigation strategies or reform attempts unworkable. Perhaps no
better example of this exists than the failure of MPC enthusiasts such as
Kadish to successfully reform California's criminal code in the 1960s-a
burden the state bears to this day.
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